Sunday 18 September 2011

Same-Sex Marriage and Christ

For all the exceptions and variations to faithful heterosexual monogamy that theologians may have discovered, the form that Christian marriage takes (whether an estate, ordinance, or sacrament) harks back to Christ's own reference to the Genesis narrative of human sexual differentiation and union. The starting point for His recorded position on the sexual ethics of His day is the Creation, not Jewish divorce laws, nor the authoritative oral law codified by the great rabbis who preceded Him.

Jesus is forthright about establishing the ancient account as the primary context for the understanding of marriage as normatively forming a kinship relation that supersedes all others in permanence to protect, support and guide the next generation that it creates. He roots his answers to the queries of His contemporaries in the fact that our God-given sexual differentiation imparts a strength of attraction that must override even filial ties in order to forge a new bond of permanent kinship that extends the human family. In essence, He’s saying ‘you can’t reverse kinship!’

On that basis, He declares the divorce laws to be a provisional (pastoral) accommodation: a recognition of the inability of any law by itself to effect fundamental changes in matters of the heart. Especially, in those whose resolve (marred as we are by the propensities of our fallen human nature) He had come to restore: ‘For what the law was powerless to do in that it was weakened by the sinful nature, God did by sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful man to be a sin offering. And so he condemned sin in sinful man.’ (Rom. 8:3). Note, He didn’t exonerate sin, but released the penitent from its guilt by punishing it, as He relinquished the human body of Jesus, His sinless healing Prince of eternal life, to the unthinkable humiliation and torture of a brutal execution.

St. Paul had a similar dilemma, as he provided marriage guidance to the Corinthian church. He couldn’t stray from the only additional divine revelation he had received from the Lord: 'Let not the wife depart from the husband’. It re-affirmed the teaching that Christ had shared with His disciples during His earthly ministry. Yet, the message was now addressed, for the most part, to Gentile civil marriages, where the wife had converted to Christ. A thoroughly novel situation. Pastorally, he extends a *limited* concession: 'But if she does (depart), she must remain unmarried or else be reconciled to her husband. And a husband must not divorce his wife.' (1 Cor. 7:11).

For all of his pastoral accommodations, the concession that he offers the wife, or husband with an unco-operative spouse is chaste separation, but not divorce. As the initiator of the marriage, a man must maintain the marriage to his unconverted wife, as long as she is pleased to remain united to him. I can’t imagine Paul, uncompromising as this text shows, would have affirmed same-sex marriage.

So, let the worldly and godless go their way and pursue homosexual civil marriage, ignoring Christ at their own peril. Let the true church refuse to allow their own rites of Holy Matrimony to follow this headlong rush towards the destruction of marriage as rooted in God’s purposes, the symptoms of which we see all around in our broken society.

Monday 12 September 2011

Mental Injury and Abortion 2

How is it that our society can set such a high bar of having to suffer a recognised psychological disorder in order to claim civil damages for mental health injury (cf. Rorrison vs. West Lothian)? Yet, in the case of the Abortion Act, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists claim, ‘… to meet the terms of the Act, a woman need not have a psychiatric illness when she makes her abortion request, but there must be factors that would involve risk to her mental health if the pregnancy were to continue. Thus, the abortion is not carried out for social reasons, although a woman’s social circumstances may be taken into account in assessing the risks to her health.’

The World Health Organisation sets a similarly low standard of risk: Health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.’

So, to get an abortion, doctors only have to identify an increased risk to mental well-being, but not of a pathological mental illness. This is in spite of the British Journal of Psychiatry report that shows abortion increases the likelihood of mental injury.

How can a civilised society lower the standard of risk avoidance when a human life is at stake, but raise it when money enters the equation?

Thursday 8 September 2011

Mental Injury and Abortion

The British Journal of Psychiatry has published a report of a recent study that investigated the link between abortion and mental health.

I refer to Peter Ould’s summary of the key findings:

‘The broad picture reveals that women who have an abortion have an 81% increased risk of mental health problems when compared with women who don’t. This constitutes “a moderate to highly increased risk of mental health problems after abortion“.

The 1967 Abortion Act provides two mental health grounds for doctors to authorise a termination of pregnancy:

(a)that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family; or

(b)that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman;

One might concede that doctors may identify specific cases in which the mental health risk is actually reduced by abortion. In the UK, it is even probable that it will take some time to establish that mental deterioration is caused by abortion, rather than just a concomitant. (Although, that is still very worrying).

What amazes me, in the light of this study, is the staggering 97.7% of abortions in 2010 that doctors authorised in the UK to prevent the risk of mental health injury as defined in the 1967 Abortion Act.

Does merely the prospect of increased stress constitute an increased risk to mental health? Where is that defined? How is the type of injury described in section 1(a) distinguished medically from the grave and permanent injury described in section 1(b)?

I read the following about mental injury: ‘To amount in law to “nervous shock” (a.k.a. mental injury), the psychiatric damage suffered by the claimant must extend beyond grief or emotional distress to a recognised mental illness’ (parenthesis mine).

In Rorrison v West Lothian, the Lord Ordinary, in dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for mental injury damages, said this:

‘"Many, if not all, employees are liable to suffer those emotions [frustration and embarrassment], and others mentioned in the present case such as stress, anxiety, loss of confidence and low mood. To suffer such emotions from time to time, not least because of problems at work, is a normal part of human existence. It is only if they are liable to be suffered to such a pathological degree as to constitute a psychiatric disorder that a duty of care to protect against them can arise…"

What this paper should prompt is a thorough review of the process for assessing mental health risk in the case of abortion. Recent calls for an anti-depressant prescription review were prompted by a much smaller sample size and a less comprehensive study.

97.7% of the abortions last year were approved in order to avert recognised pathological mental illnesses, rather than just emotional distress.

Are doctors required to identify the actual illness that might otherwise result? If they are not and merely authorise the abortion on demand, I’m sorry, but that fact alone beggars belief in the current system!

Tuesday 6 September 2011

Evidence that demands a verdict

Let us realise that the approach of the New Testament writers is primarily forensic (as it relates to the true origin of that word, forum), rather than strictly scientific. The forum was the ancient courtroom that primarily collected and tested oral testimony in order to arrive at a decision. There was no luxury of experimenting in the laboratory. The character and oral statement of a witness were even more crucial to establishing the truth than it is today. Arguments would need to be skilfully and logically presented. The motives of each side would need to be examined. ‘By the mouths of two or three witnesses shall every word be established’ (2 Cor. 13:1) was the corollary. The court could even inflict harm to see whether it might cause someone to recant their testimony.

An unrepeatable historic event occurs and over 500 people claim to have witnessed the reality of it over a period of several weeks. Unlike a laboratory experiment, history cannot be verified by repetition. Yet, we accept a world that already consigns those convicted by credible testimony to long terms of imprisonment and, in some countries, death.

So, why do we hesitate on account of faith decisions? Is it not because we are hopelessly prejudiced against the outcome and find the personal implications of acceptance unbearable? Our guilt is fixed by this double standard, as John said, ‘If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater.’ (1John 5:9)

The first-century movement claimed a growing following of those who were convinced that the continuation of miraculous events corroborated the testimony that Jesus had returned to life forever. Hardened, but thoughtful critics were eventually won over by the positive impact on the lives of that following who saw virtue in eschewing personal gain for others. The calm, sane leaders of the movement were also willing to sacrifice their own safety, yet maintained their testimony without a hint of retaliation. Moreover, they extended compassion towards their persecutors.

We can question the likelihood, motives, relative resourcefulness and credibility of the witnesses to the resurrection and their detractors. We may be swayed by rhetoric, the resonance of the testimony with our own first-hand experiences of personal guilt and what we know of human nature. This is as it should be in a courtroom.

However, there is one caveat. Ultimately, we, the jury, are also on trial. The motives and prejudices of our own lives face as much scrutiny as the biblical witness itself. We sit in judgement and still desperately need a cure for own own selfish nature, a cure that the early church and those who, through the ages, were touched by its faith and practice appear to have found.

It would be criminally negligent to ignore such a cure, if it exists. So, we can no more postpone our judgement indefinitely after careful deliberation than we do in a court of law. There is an awful responsibility for continuing in error, if all the evidence points to a conclusive remedy.

Friday 2 September 2011

Heart of Mine

ONE DAY YOU MAY FIND TRUE LOVE THAT WILL LAST FOREVER AND EVER
TILL THEN YOU'LL SPEND A LIFETIME WISHING ONE TOGETHER
YOU NEVER THOUGHT SHE'D SAY GOODBYE
AND YOU'LL NEVER UNDERSTAND THE REASONS WHY

HEART OF MINE
HOW WILL YOU KEEP FROM DYING
STOP REMINISCING WHO IS SHE KISSING?
HEART OF MINE
OH WHAT'S THE USE IN TRYING
NO ONE CAN MEND YOU NOW

LOVE PLAYS CRUEL GAMES
YOU CAN'T BELIEVE SHE'S FOUND ANOTHER LOVER
"DOES SHE MISS ME?"
SOMETIMES YOU JUST CAN'T HELP BUT WONDER
NO, YOU CAN'T HOLD THE HANDS OF TIME
AND YOU'LL ALWAYS BE THE ONE SHE LEFT BEHIND

HEART OF MINE...